 |
|
Lord
Roberts and Sir Alfred Milner with some of their Staff Officers |
Mafeking.
From: Volume IV. Chapter XVII. The Siege of Mafeking.
L. S. Amery, editor, The Times History of the South African War (1906).
CHAPTER XVII
THE SIEGE OF MAFEKING
General appearance of Mafeking.
MAFEKING, the
most northerly town in Cape
Colony, has little to distinguish it from countless other trading settlements
and villages in South Africa. It consists of a railway station and the usual
straggling collection of low mud-built houses and stores roofed with corrugated
iron, while half a mile to the south-west on either bank of the Molopo River,
flowing cast to west, lie thickly clustered the round huts of a Kaffir stad. So
much are houses and huts the colour of their natural surroundings, that, except
when quite close, only an eye well accustomed to South African scenes could
distinguish village from veld. This is the more remarkable since the veld here
is almost unbroken, save for the river's deep channel and some trifling
undulations of 100 to 150 feet on its southern bank, and to the west of the
town. The hard, rocky surface of the ground, which sends forth only some thin
grass and stunted shrubs, is well indicated by the name Mafeking,
in native language the "Place of Stones."
The
previous history.
But in spite of this unpromising aspect,
Mafeking itself and the surrounding country have been from very early days in
the history of the Transvaal a subject of contention. In 1852, the very year of
the Sand River Convention, the Boer farmers had begun raiding the territory of
the Bechuana chiefs on their western border, where they came into collision with Montsioa's tribe of Barolongs, whose headquarters were at Mafeking.
Border forays continued till 1868, when President Pretorius thought to have
settled the questions at issue by proclaiming the whole of Bechuanaland as far
west as Lake N'Gami to be within the territory of the Transvaal. Montsioa
consistently but fruitlessly appealed for British protection, until in 1871 the
Keate award definitely declared Mafeking
to be outside the limits of the Transvaal and within Great Britain's
sphere of influence. Although the burghers never acknowledged the ,justice of
this award, there was no more serious trouble till after the Transvaal had
regained its independence by the Convention of 1881. In that year quarrels among
the tribes gave an opportunity to freebooters, both Boer and British, to assist
various chiefs on the promise of farms for themselves. The British freebooters
were warned off by a proclamation of the High Commissioner; but the Boer
adventurers, less scrupulously kept in check, formed the two independent
republics of Stellaland at Vryburg and Goshen at Rooigrond, which is on the
borders of the Transvaal
and Bechuanaland, and only six miles from Mafeking.
Molltsioa's cattle and his land, being naturally an object of desire to the
republicans of Goshen, were the cause of several bloody conflicts. Finally, the
attention of the Imperial Government was drawn to the matter in 1884 by
President Kruger's proclamation annexing the disputed territory to the republic
in direct violation of the Convention of London. On the High Commissioner's
remonstrance the proclamation was withdrawn, and in 1885 Sir Charles Warren's
expedition* put an end to the republic of Goshen. Sir Charles proclaimed the
whole of Bechuanaland
to be a British protectorate, dug wells and built forts at Mafeking, and laid
out the present European town as the seat of the Resident Commissioner. Mafeking
from that time became an important settlement. It was the starting-point for
hunting expeditions into the Kalahari desert,
and a busy place for traders, who exchanged manufactured goods for cattle or the skins of
wild beasts with the natives and the Boer farmers over the border. In 1894 it
became connected by railway with Vryburg and Kimberley, and in 1896 was the base
from which General Carrington's troops started to suppress the Matabele
rebellion. The year before Mafeking with the rest of Bechuanaland south of the
Molopo had been handed over to the Cape by the Imperial Government, a transference of
authority which enabled Dr. Jameson to prepare for his raid in comparative
secrecy. In 1897 the railway was extended to Buluwayo from
Mafeking. The town thereby lost its importance as a terminus, but owing to its
favourable position on the border always remained a thriving commercial centre
and a considerable railway depot.
[* The late Sir George Baden-Powell, brother of the defender of Mafeking, accompanied Sir Charles Warren on this expedition in a political capacity].
Oct.
1899. Anxiety of the Boers to capture Mafeking. Commandos under Cronje gather
around the town.
The previous history of
Mafeking accounts, therefore, for the importance attached by the Transvaal Boers
to its possession. Those on the western border had never ceased to feel a sense
of grievance that it was not theirs, while the whole nation, since the Jameson
raid, regarded it with apprehension in the hands of the English as a convenient
starting-point for an expeditionary force against their capital. Accordingly,
when war seemed imminent in the early days of October, one of the largest forces
put into the field by the Boers assembled at various camps on the border close
to Mafeking. According to a Boer account this force numbered between 9,000 and
11,000, and was composed of the Marico, Lichtenberg, Rustenburg, Potchefstroom
and Wolmaransstad commandos. Its commander was Piet Cronje, considered their
boldest general by the more warlike spirits among the Boers, and under him were
De la Rey, J. P. Snyman and Hans Botha. This force crossed the border as soon as
war was declared, and after cutting the line north and south of Mafeking
proceeded to close round the town.
Only at the last moment had a small British force been thrown into Mafeking. Colonel Baden-Powell had been sent in July with a few other special service officers to raise two regiments of mounted men for service on the western border.
Colonel Plumer's Rhodesian Regiment, based on Tuli, was one of these, the other, called the Protectorate Regiment, recruited from the same sources as Plumer’s, was under Lieut.-Colonel Hore. Owing to the unwillingness of the Cape Government to allow any appearance of military demonstrations, this regiment was not at first concentrated at Mafeking, but eighteen miles further north at Ramathlabama, the border station of the Imperial Protectorate. However, Colonel Baden-Powell, whose general instructions had been to protect the borders of Bechuanaland and Rhodesia in case of war, and to draw as many Boers as possible away from the south, had from the first realised the importance of holding Mafeking. It was essential to prevent the Boers from acquiring so convenient a base for any designs they might have on Kimberley and Cape Colony or on Rhodesia, all the more as it was well stocked with food and forage and railway material ; while its loss would be a considerable blow to British prestige among the native tribes in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Moreover, a British force concentrated here would be useful for any offensive operations which might be contemplated against the weak western flank of the Transvaal. Accordingly, at the end of September, on receiving authority from the High Commissioner, Baden-Powell moved down from Ramathlabama with all the troops he had been able to collect and set about placing Mafeking in a state of defence.
Colonel R. S. S. Baden-Powell's record.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. S. Baden-Powell, who commanded
the troops at Mafeking during
the longest siege in the South African War, was forty-two years old in 1899. Two
years previously, after attaining the rank of major in the 13th Hussars, he had
been appointed lieutenant-colonel commanding the 5th Dragoon Guards. During his
twenty-three years' service he had been employed in India, Afghanistan,
Ashanti and South Africa, where, besides being Assistant Military Secretary, he
had taken part in operations in Zululand and was chief staff officer to Sir Frederick
Carrington during the Matabele campaign. In the course of that war he had been
able to make himself well acquainted with the country he was now called upon to
defend, since his column started marching up country from Mafeking. A bold rider
and a sportsman, he was devoted to his profession, and had shown much
originality in his methods of training and instruction. The uncompromising enemy of hidebound rules
and unintelligent drill, he made it his aim to develop initiative and individual
responsibility, not only in junior officers but in every man of a regiment, and
always laid great stress on the use of observation and intelligence in war.
The
men and arms at his disposal.
It certainly needed a man of some originality to organise a
successful defence against the odds with which Colonel Baden-Powell found
himself confronted. In men he was hopelessly outnumbered by Cronje's 10,000. His
trained troops amounted to between 700 and 800, composed of about 470 of the
Protectorate Regiment under Colonel Hore (South
Staffords), 90 British South Africa Police (Protectorate contingent) under
Lieut.-Colonel Walford, 100 Cape Police under Inspectors Marsh and Browne, and
70 Bechuanaland Rifles under Captain Cowan. But, though these troops were few in
number, they were well fitted for the work before them The Police and
Bechuanaland Rifles were men accustomed to the country and to independent work
on the border; the Protectorate Regiment, recruited chiefly from the Cape ports,
had been trained during the past two months with great care by Baden-Powell,
who, disregarding the text-books, had encouraged the men to work with a
consciousness of the country in which they had to fight and of the tricky enemy
they would meet, without necessarily waiting for orders in situations requiring
prompt decision. Moreover, their officers were mostly picked men who had been
sent out with the Colonel in July, numbering among them Major Godley of the
Dublin Fusiliers and Captains Lord Charles Bentinck, Marsh, Vernon,
and FitzClarence. In addition to the trained troops nearly all the able-bodied
white men in Mafeking had been enrolled for service. From the first Baden-Powell
had recognised the advantage of actively associating the townspeople in the
defence of their own homes, not merely for the sake of their additional numbers,
but also in order to enlist their sympathy with his operations; and in this view
he was cordially met by the townspeople themselves, headed by their patriotic
Mayor, Mr. Whiteley. During September he had sent Lieut.-Colonel Vyvyan of the Buffs
into Mafeking to organise secretly a town guard to take their share in manning the
trenches. Nearly every able-bodied man in the town volunteered, so that when
Laden-Powell arrived in October he found an additional 400, composed of
townspeople, railway men and refugees, ready to shoulder a rifle. Besides this
garrison of 1,200 white men, he determined to utilise a certain number of
natives. His reason for doing this was that he proposed to include the native
stad in his scheme of defence, for otherwise the natives who were under British
protection would hardly escape the depredations of a Boer force attacking
Mafeking. Accordingly he had between 400 and 500 of them enrolled and armed to
serve as cattle guards, watchmen, and scouts, and to help in the defence of
their own village; he employed many more in digging trenches and building forts.
In his dealings with the natives he was fortunate in obtaining the assistance of
Major Hamilton Goold-Adams, the Resident Commissioner of the Protectorate, and
of Mr. C. G. H. Bell, the Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, both then
stationed at Mafeking. The number of women and children left in the town was
about 650, so that with the garrison the total European population was under
2,000. The native stad by the river normally had a population of 6,000, but this
had been increased by the influx of nearly 1,000 native refugees from the
Johannesburg mines. The rifles available for the white garrison were partly Lee-Metfords
and partly Martini-Henrys, while the natives had to content themselves chiefly
with Sniders and elephant guns. The artillery under the command of Major Panzera
was even more defective than the supply of rifles, for it contained no single
modern piece, and consisted of four muzzle-loading 7-pdrs. with a range of 2,500
yards, a 1-pdr. Hotchkiss, a 2-inch Nordenfelt, and seven .303 Maxims. The total
amount of ammunition was somewhere about 500,000 rounds of .303 ammunition,
60,000 rounds of .303 Maxim ammunition, 150,000 rounds of M.H. ammunition,
10,000 rounds of Snider, 200 rounds per 7-pdr. gun, 10,000 rounds of Nordenfelt,
150 rounds for the Hotchkiss, and a certain amount of loose powder, consisting
of fine and blasting powder.
Preparations for a siege.
To make up for deficiency in numbers and in artillery
Baden-Powell during the first days of October had made full use of the time
allowed him for preparations. He had sent down to the Cape all the women and
children, amounting to 170, who wished to leave, and had lodged in gaol several
Dutchmen suspected of being Boer spies. Gangers were despatched north and
south, under the direction of Captain More, the district engineer of the Cape
railways, to collect all loose rails and material and bring them in to Mafeking
; a defensive line for the use of armoured trains was laid in a northeasterly
direction at right angles to the main line; an armoured train was made up of
trucks protected by a framework of rails fastened together and of an armoured
engine sent up from Kimberley at Baden-Powell's request.* At the same time an
elaborate plan was drawn up for the defence of the town and each quarter
assigned to definite detachments of the garrison; while every moment during the
early days of October, that could be spared from digging trenches and making
preparations, was employed in practising the men at attack and defence of the
town.
Description of the perimeter defended and the system of forts and trenches
adopted.
When the English settlement of Mafeking was laid out by Sir
Charles Warren in 1885 the site was not chosen with
any view to military
defence, but chiefly on account of the good drainage slope and in order to be
sufficiently near Montsioa's stad to allow the native population to take
advantage of the traders' stores and, at the same time, to enable Europeans and
natives to afford each other mutual support in the event of further trouble with
freebooters from the Transvaal. In 1899 it was roughly 1,000 yards square with
two open spaces, Government Square and Market Square, in the centre. The only exception to the
uniformly one-storeyed houses was the two-storeyed Roman Catholic convent some
two hundred yards to the north of the town ; near it was the hospital built in
1899 with accommodation for forty patients. On the west lay the railway station
with its store sheds and sidings, with the line running through it from north to
south. The water supply was derived from wells dug in Sir Charles Warren's time
and from springs 4,300 yards from the north-eastern edge of the town, whence the
water was conveyed partly in an open furrow and partly in pipes to the town.
Halfway between the town and these springs was the racecourse. The area of
defence, measured from the north-eastern corner of the town to the south-western
extremity of the stad, was a mile and three-quarters in length; but in spite of
his small numbers, Baden-Powell determined to hold a perimeter of seven or eight
miles. His furthest point south, over a mile from the town, was an old fort
called Cannon Kopje, built by Sir Charles Warren on the rising ground beyond the
Molopo River, and commanding the whole of Mafeking ; thence the original line
of trenches gradually came closer to the town on the east, and, after skirting
some brickfields, hugged the north-eastern side of the town, whence it zigzagged
round the hospital and convent to Fort Ayr, built on the rising ground nearly
two miles to the west ; from that point it passed the native stad until it carne
back to Cannon Kopje. Numerous forts and redoubts .were constructed along this
line of trenches, and inside them other forts and trenches from which an enemy
penetrating the first line would be taken in flank. Between
Fort Ayr and the town a laager with bomb-proof shelters and covered ways was
constructed for the women and children, and all the inhabitants were advised to
provide themselves with similar shelters on their own account. Barricades were
piled across the streets to enable the defenders to make a last stand if the
assailants reached so far, and mines were laid in the immediate neighborhood
of the town.
Distribution of the garrison.
The distribution of the garrison was as follows. To the
Protectorate Regiment was apportioned the duty of defending the western and
south-western line of defences, Captain Marsh's squadron being placed in the
native village to support the natives in case of necessity, and a squadron held
in reserve at the old B.S.A. Police Fort, which was Colonel Hore's own
headquarters. Major Godley had entire command of the western portion of the
defence. The Barolongs were elected to hold the south-west side, pushing their
men out far enough to cover their cattle when grazing. Cannon
Kopje, the key of the position, was assigned to Colonel Walford, with the B.S.A.
Police, while Mackenzie's native contingent, called the " Black Watch," and
another party of natives filled gaps on his right and left respectively.
Inspector Marsh's division of the
Cape Police were held in support of this part of the defence line. Inspector
Browne's division occupied the south-east corner of the town (Ellis's Corner),
and the Bechuanaland Rifles, under Captain Cowan, the north-east, with a reserve
in the Town Hall. The Railway division, under Lieutenant More, held the north
and north-west front of the town, including the Railway camp. The Town Guard,
under Colonel Vyvyan, held the trenches erected immediately round the town
itself, the chief points being Hospital Redan on the north, de Kock's, Musson's
and Ellitson's Corners on the east, and Dall's, Dixon's, and Early's on the
south.
The garrison was indeed small for so wide an area, especially as there were no natural features to assist in the defence of the town. But undoubtedly Baden-Powell was wise in extending his lines far out, for the chief danger was likely to come from the enemy's artillery, which was certain to outrange his miserable old guns, and the further he could push out his riflemen, the less likely were guns to damage the town. Moreover, he to a great extent neutralised the difficulty of communication over so extended an area by having a complete system of telephones connecting his own office in the centre of the town with each fort and post. Every commander was allowed full liberty as to the disposition of his own force and the defence of the quarter assigned to him, but by his admirable system of communication the Colonel was always able to bring reinforcements to bear on any position which was hard pressed or to move about his artillery; and in all arrangements of this nature he was ably seconded by his chief staff officer, Major Lord Edward Cecil.
Good
food supply.
But, however well organised for defence a garrison may be,
it has little chance of standing a siege if its food runs short. In this respect Mafeking was singularly fortunate. There were a large number of cattle in the town,
principally the property of the natives; for these enough ground for grazing was
secured by the wide area of defence. Six weeks' full rations for the men and
forage for the horses of the protectorate Regiment were in store, and large
stocks of food were in the possession of the important South African firm of
Julius Weil & Co., who had a branch here under the charge of Mr. B. B. Weil,
one of the partners. Their stock alone was so considerable that it was valued at
XXX30,000, and the successful defence of Mafeking
is no doubt partly due to their forethought. Besides these stores, Mr. Whiteley
had a large supply of food, and large consignments
on the way to Buluwayo and other up-country towns were found at the station
after the line had been cut.
Boers determined not to fail for want of numbers.
Thus Baden-Powell was prepared at all points. The Boers on
their side, in spite of their large numbers, were not altogether easy about
him. He had already obtained a reputation among them as a bold and original
leader, arid they had a greater opinion of the colonials, whom they knew be had
been training at Ramathlabama, than of the regular soldiers. For that reason
they were determined not to let him escape for want of numbers, and in spite of
their belief in his ingenuity, felt that with 10,000 men they must be able to
overwhelm him and his handful of men in their exposed position.
October 13, 1899, Mafeking cut off.
During the three days preceding the expiry of the ultimatum
Cronje's forces were spread along a line of twenty-five miles on the western
border next to Mafeking.
About noon on the 12th Baden-Powell received information from
Maretsani, twenty-four miles south, that a party of armed Boers had crossed the
border early that morning and were proceeding in the direction of Kraaipan,
doubtless with the intention of trying to overpower the force of Cape Police
supposed to be there. In this they were frustrated, as Baden-Powell had called
the force into Mafeking on the previous day, but they cut the garrison's
telegraphic communication with the south. The following morning native spies
told of the appearance of parties of Boers at Ramathlabama, and the telegraph
line to Buluwayo was interrupted. From that moment Mafeking
was entirely
shut off from regular communication with the outside world.
Baden-Powell defends himself by taking the offensive.
But, though Mafeking was
now isolated and threatened by greatly superior numbers, Baden-Powell from the
first adopted the policy of defending himself by taking the offensive. He had
taken every precaution to make himself safe inside Mafeking, but he had no
intention of sitting there and allowing himself to be quietly besieged. In his
own words he was determined to show the vitality of the garrison and he was
determined to mystify his assailants by delivering vigorous "kicks" at them. On
the 13th he began by sending out the armoured train to interrupt a party of
Boers who were destroying the line four miles to the south; after an exchange of
rifle fire the Boers temporarily abandoned their operations. On the same day he
unintentionally caused considerable alarm to them by the expedient for getting
rid of two truck-loads of dynamite which were discovered at the station. Being
apprehensive lest a Boer shell might explode them, he ordered them to he taken
well out on the veld to the north of the town and there left. The engine-driver
charged with the business, after taking the dynamite some six miles along the
line saw Boers in the distance, whereupon he uncoupled the trucks, gave them a
good shunt in their direction, and returned with his engine. The Boers opened a
heavy fire on the trucks as they came nearer, which resulted in the explosion of
some twenty tons of dynamite. It was afterwards ascertained
that the Boers relieved this explosion to have been intentional, a belief which
by no means diminished their respect for the mines which they knew to have been
laid in the immediate neighbourhood of the town.
Oct.
14. FitzClarence's attack on the Boers.
On the 14th Baden-Powell sent out the armoured train under Captain
William of the B.S.A.P. with about fifty men, two Maxims and the Hotchkiss to
punish some Boers who had fired on one of his patrols three miles to the north.
After an interchange of heavy firing between the armoured train sand the Boers,
Baden-Powell despatched the reserve squadron of the Protectorate Regiment, under
Captain FitzClarence, in support. The Boers, giving way before FitzClarence's attack, him too far into bush country, where they were well
protected, while he was out of touch with the train and
somewhat exposed. However, a gun sent up under Lieutenant Murchison enabled the
squadron to retire on the, train with a loss of two killed
and sixteen wounded, the Boer loss, according to their own
accounts, being only three. On this, the first occasion when the Protectorate
Regiment were under fire, they gave ample proof of their good material and of
their careful training and steadiness in a difficult position.
Investing lines occupied by the Boers.
So far the Boers had been taking up an attitude of defence rather than of
offence. Being unwilling to take any risks in crossing the open ground round the
town, they found one of their chief difficulties in attacking to be the absence
of commanding positions for their guns and sharpshooters to occupy. However, as
there was nothing to prevent an investing line being drawn, they gradually
moved their camps as close as possible round the town, taking full advantage of
every slight rise in the ground not already occupied by the defenders. By the
end of the month Cronje had brought his head laager with the Potchefstroom
burghers to Jackal Tree, a low hill marked by a single thorn tree 5,000 yards
south of the town and almost in a line with Cannon Kopje; at M'Mullen's Farm,
three miles to the east on the Molopo River, Snyman had his own Marico commando
besides the men from Wolmaransstad; Signal Hill, three and a half miles to the
north-east, was the headquarters of the Rustenburg commando under Steenekamp;
and a mile and a half to the north-west, near the railway, Field-Cornet Eloff, a
grandson of the President, had a detachment in occupation of Game Tree Hill, a
slight mound from which stood out a solitary acacia. Another detachment of the Rustenburgers was west of the stad, and smaller laagers and gun positions were
dotted about between these main camps. The point where the Boer trenches
approached the town most nearly was in the brickfields to the east, where
disused kilns and spent clay-pits gave excellent cover for their marksmen. Their
artillery was in every way superior to that of the defenders. At first they had
two 7 pdrs., one 12 pdr., one 9 pdr. Krupp, two quick firing 14 pdrs. and a
pom-pom, all fitted with a breech-loading action. They had thus, as they said,
"shut up the meercat in his hole."
October 16. The bombardment begins.
On the 16th the Boers opened the bombardment with two guns from Signal
Hill. The cannonade was continued till
1 o'clock without eliciting any reply from the garrison, whose
guns had a range barely half as great as that of their opponents. The Boers also
cut off the water supply from the springs, but this proved a comparatively
harmless measure, as the townspeople had previously been warned to fill all
their tanks and cisterns, and for the rest of the siege found the supply of
water from the wells and the Molopo River ample. Snyman, who was in command of
the Boer attack on this day, was puzzled at the garrison making no resistance,
and sent in a messenger under a flag of truce to learn the reason and summon the
town to surrender, in order, as he said, to stop further bloodshed. The Colonel
received this emissary, an Englishman named Everitt, with a polite request that
he might be informed when the bloodshed was to begin, as so far only one fowl
had been killed. Everitt was detained to lunch and a message sent to Snyman, who
was seen to be putting guns into position and intrenching, to say that he was
acting contrary to the rules of civilised war in working during a truce. In
point of fact only two shots had taken effect, and these had gone into the
convent and hospital, which were both flying the red cross flag. The hospital
was unfortunately situated and came more under fire than any other part of the
town, for the convent next to it, being the only two-storeyed building in
Mafeking, made a convenient ranging mark for the Boer gunners.
The trenches and bomb-proof shelters in
Mafeking.
After this first day's shelling, except for a few skirmishes on the outposts and
some comparatively harmless cannonading by the Boers, there was a week's pause
in active hostilities. The garrison employed the time in perfecting their
trenches and bomb-proof shelters. The trenches were loopholed according to a
special system of Baden-Powell's, who recognised that the regulation four-inch
loophole unnecessarily restricted a marksman's vision. Instead of four inches,
therefore, he insisted on loopholes four feet wide, which gave a wide range of
fire, and in no way detracted from the man's safety. At first the Colonel had
some difficulty in persuading the garrison and townspeople to use the shelters
against gun-fire. It was regarded as rather a point of honour not to be seen
running underground at the first sound of cannon. But gradually, as it became
evident that the Boer shells, though harmless to those underground, were able to
inflict damage in the streets and houses, wiser counsels prevailed. Before the
end of the siege, besides the carefully made tunnels and passages in the women's
laager, almost every house in the town and outlying work had its own shelter. In
most cases this consisted of a trench dug some three or four feet wide, five to
six feet deep, and sufficiently long to afford room for its occupants to sit
side by side. Fortunately the soil was gravelly and the sides of the trenches
required little or no support. A roof was provided by means of railway rails,
taken from the stock thoughtfully collected before the siege commenced. These
were laid across the trench, and above them sheets of galvanized iron, while the
whole was covered over with three or four feet of earth. The shelters thus
provided were known to be not actually shell-proof from a direct hit, but were
quite sufficient to guard against flying splinters or the effects of shrapnel
fire. Where possible these bomb-proofs were placed behind the walls of houses
with a view to the shells bursting on first contact with the walls, and thus
giving no direct blow to the shelters. Throughout the siege look-out men would
signal to headquarters the part of the town against which a Boer gun was being
trained. A certain number of bells, to correspond with the quarter indicated,
would forthwith be rung to prepare the inhabitants, and as soon as the flash of
the gun was seen, the final alarm bell would be sounded; this just gave time for
the inhabitants of the threatened quarter to take refuge in their shelters
before the shell arrived. It was not long before these warning bells had become
as much a part of the daily routine in
Mafeking as the dinner-bell is to the ordinary citizen.
October 23. The Boers bring up a 94-pdr. Creusot gun.
The Boers during the same period pushed forward their trenches, bringing them
within 1,200 yards of the town on the brickfields side. They also obtained
reinforcements. On the 21st October the Scandinavian corps arrived at Cronje's
laager, bringing with them one of the four great Long Toms, a Creusot
breech-loading gun which fired a 941b. shell at an extreme range of 10,000
yards.*
[ * This gun became familiarly known to the garrison as "Big Ben." Another smaller gun of the Boers was given the name of " Gentle Annie."]
The day before a letter arrived from Cronje informing the commander of the garrison that he was unable to take Mafeking without bombardment, which would commence at 6 A.M. on October 23. A suitable reply was sent, and, in return for his courteous warning of the proposed bombardment, Cronje was informed that dynamite mines had been laid round the town; a notice was issued to the inhabitants recommending them to make arrangements "to spend the day underground on Monday, with a supply of food and literature," in case the threat should come true. On the clay appointed the monster gun duly opened fire, but although the noise of the shells was alarming and their effect on the mud walls destructive, their only serious result was that one man and one horse were slightly wounded, and once more the death of a chicken was reported from the garrison poultry-yard. In some ways the Scandinavians proved more useful than the big gun, for they showed great activity and succeeded in discovering and rendering innocuous a large number of the mines which had been laid down on the outskirts of the town.
October 25-November 7. Attacks and counter-attacks.
The fortnight succeeding the first bombardment by the 94-pdr. was the most
exciting period of the siege, for the Boers made two fairly determined attempts
to storm the place, and Baden-Powell answered by surprise attacks on their
advanced trenches. On the 25th Cronje opened fire in the early morning from
seven of his guns, and sent forward parties of his men to make simultaneous
attacks on the Barolong stad to the south-west and on the north-east. The
garrison made no reply to the Boer artillery, and reserved their fire until the
attacking parties were within rifle-range.
The Boers had expected little resistance from the Barolongs and intended the attack on that quarter as a feint to cover a more serious assault on the north-east. But when they found the natives quite prepared to repel them and Captain Marsh's squadron of the Protectorate Regiment also intrenched there, they gave up the undertaking before they had time to develop the attack on the other side. Two nights later Baden-Powell followed up his success by a sally against an advanced trench of the Marico laager on the racecourse, which, being only 2000 yards away, gave considerable annoyance to the townspeople. Captain FitzClarence and fifty-five men of his squadron were entrusted with the undertaking. Starting at midnight, they arrived unperceived at the trenches, which they rushed with fixed bayonets. The Boers, though surprised, opened fire at once, killing six, wounding nine, and capturing two of their assailants, the rest of whom then scattered according to orders and retired to Mafeking under the guidance of two signal lights hoisted by the garrison. Although the Boers seem to have had only three casualties in this engagement, they were thoroughly unnerved by the surprise, and continued firing aimless volleys for some time after FitzClarence had retired. Moreover, for many months they did not reoccupy this trench.
October 31. The attack on Cannon Kopje.
On the 31st Cronje made an attack on Cannon Kopje, the outpost to the south. The
Boers called it Babiaans or Monkey Fort, because Baden-Powell had erected
there one of the tall, iron wind-pumps, which are a common feature in South
Africa, for a look-out man to climb up and report on the Boer movements. It was
recognized by both sides as the key of Mafeking, for a
Boer gun there could soon have reduced the town to dust. For some time
previously the Boer artillery had been devoting a considerable amount of
attention to this work, and not a day passed but it was severely shelled. Owing
to the rocky ground Colonel Walford, who commanded the
B.S.A.P. detachment
in charge, could not construct any sort of shell-proof cover for his men in the
fort itself, though he himself managed to scratch a hole between two stones
close to the parapet about 8 feet long, 3 feet deep, and 3 feet broad, in which
lie lived
throughout the whole siege; however, he made a
deep enough trench for his men in a small fold in the ground about forty yards
in rear. The look-out man with one or two others and the Colonel were as a rule
the fort's sole occupants. As daylight broke on the last morning in October,
Cronje concentrated a very heavy crossfire with his guns on Cannon Kopje. On
the high ground to the south were to be seen several men holding a large number
of riderless horses, the riders not being visible and evidently hidden in the
long grass in front of them. As the light became better, from the town men could
be seen rising and running forward and dropping in the grass. These were
burghers of the Potchefstroom commando, which Cronje had chosen for the attack.
During their advance a heavy artillery and rifle fire was directed on the fort,
and the telephone connection with headquarters was cut. When they were within
400 yards, the shell fire still continuing, Colonel Walford called to his men to
come from shelter and man the parapets. Though standing out practically without
cover the little garrison of forty-five men opened with their magazines and two
Maxims on the foremost line of Boers, who had hastily dug themselves a shallow
trench from which they kept up a vigorous rifle fire, At the same time
Baden-Powell, perceiving another party advancing more to the south-west, to take
the fort in flank, opened fire on them from the town with two 1-pounders under
Lieutenant Murchison. It only needed about five minutes of this gun play to
check and disperse the enemy. The Boers rose all together out of the long grass,
appeared for an instant to hesitate, formed one long thick line in a
semi-circular formation round the kopje, and then turned and fled towards their
horses. The little garrison, though still being shelled, continued their fire at
the retreating mass till they were out of range. With the retreat of the enemy
the garrison were again taken back to cover. The fight was over by
8.30 A.m., but the casualties were two officers (Captain Hon.
Douglas H. Marsham and Captain Charles A. K. Pechell) and four men killed, and
five men wounded. With the retreat of the Potchefstroom commando, the
Rustenburgers, who had been preparing to attack
Mafeking on the other side, also retired. In this engagement the
Boers lost more heavily than usual.
Nov. 7. Attack on the western laager.
Finally, on November 7, Baden-Powell organized another night attack, this time
on the western Boer laager, which had been recently moved up closer to their
trenches. The conduct of the attack was entrusted to Major Godley with sixty of
the Protectorate Regiment under Captain Vernon, thirty Bechuanaland Rifles under
Captain Cowan, and three guns under Major Panzera. The Boer camp was surprised,
but, on reinforcements arriving, Godley withdrew his force; his retirement was
effectively covered by the Bechuanaland Rifles, who took up a position in Fort
Ayr, and by a 7-pounder brought to the west of the stad. At a cost of only five
casualties he had accomplished his object, since the Boer laager was moved
farther away on the following night.
Nov. 19. Cronje gives up the investment, leaving Snyman in
charge.
Cronje so far had certainly not maintained his reputation for daring by these
operations, and
Pretoria
and Johannesburg were beginning to chafe at his slowness. The newspapers,
which had been given to understand that the capture of
Mafeking
would be a matter of only a few days, began to find all sorts of excuses for his
failure. At one time it was said that he wished to clear out the men stated to
be lying in wait for him in the women's laager before venturing on an attack, in
spite of Baden-Powell's warning to him that the laager contained only women and
children; at another that the dynamite mines round the town were the obstacle.
On one day an attack was delayed because of the slippery state of the ground.
Throughout Cronje showed an exaggerated fear of risking too many burghers'
lives. At last, after he had been sitting in front of Mafeking for five weeks,
the absurdity of wasting nearly a third of the two republics' available forces
on the capture of one small town became obvious. On November 19 Cronje moved
away with the Potchefstroom and Wolmaransstad commandos, the Scandinavians, and
six of the guns, to take part in the more important operations in the
neighbourhood of
Kimberley.
But there was no intention to raise the siege, for General Snyman was still left
there in command of two or three thousand men of the Marico, Lichtenburg and
Rustenburg commandos, the Long Tom and four other guns. This reduced force was
spread out to take up the same positions that Cronje had held, and was quite
strong enough to maintain the investing lines.
Snyman's conduct of the siege.
But if Cronje
had shown a want of vigour in prosecuting the siege, Snyman was positively
apathetic. In the words of a German eyewitness, "with touching patience and a
truly classical repose he lay before Mafeking and passively allowed
circumstances to occur." On the whole the Boers enjoyed the siege, which, unless
they were attacked by the English, was little else than a pleasant picnic. A
convenient service of coaches ran to Johannesburg, bringing them comforts and
luxuries, and enabling them to relieve any monotony in the camp life by
excursions to their homes or to a town. Their guns, the number of which was
increased at the beginning of December by two more 5-pdrs. and a pom-pom sent
from
Pretoria,
were an unfailing source of entertainment. Being able to work them out of range
of any English guns, they felt perfect security in directing their fire on
houses or other buildings in the town, so much so that it was not uncommon for
the women who came to visit their relations in laager to be allowed to fire off
a shell after the gun had been laid by the gunners. On Sundays, by mutual
agreement with the defenders, there was a holiday, when the two sides would
occasionally have friendly chats from one another's advanced trenches, and even
exchange newspapers or whisky. The Boers were no doubt genuinely anxious to
capture Mafeking, but they saw no reason to risk their own lives unnecessarily
in the process. They had little fear of an early relief, and even if Plumer, who
was giving them considerable trouble further north, succeeded in reaching
Mafeking, they felt themselves numerous enough to hold him as well as
Baden-Powell inside. They were therefore quite content to prevent the garrison
escaping, and to leave their submission to the combined effects of hunger and
persistent bombardment.
Mafeking's
food supply taken over by the military.
For the garrison itself and the townspeople the greatest danger, when it became
apparent that a relief could not be effected for several months, was that a
spirit of slackness and hopelessness might sap their energy or impair their
watchfulness. The Boer bombardment, when the system of shelters had been
thoroughly organised, was only harmful to buildings, not to human beings, except
in the stad, where the natives could not be persuaded to adopt the precautions
taken by the Europeans. The danger of actual starvation was small, thanks to the
large supplies of food in the town, and to Baden-Powell's wisdom in taking over
all stocks at a very early stage and rigidly controlling its distribution by his
chief supply officer, Captain Ryan, A.S.C. There was naturally a good deal of
discontent and grumbling at the restricted allowances, and when the town was at
last relieved there was a considerable margin left; but considering the
uncertainty, the Colonel would have laid himself open to reproach had he been
less strict.*
[ * In his despatch on the siege Colonel Baden-Powell gives the following account of his arrangements for the food supply:
"Early in the siege I took over all merchant stocks and put everybody on rations. Beginning on the usual scale, I gradually reduced it to the lowest that would allow of the men being fit for duty. During the latter part of the siege no extras of any kind were obtainable. All lived strictly on the following scale:Meat, at first 1 lb., latterly ¾ to 1 lb.
Bread, at first 1 lb., latterly 5 oz.
Vegetables, at first 1 lb., latterly 6 oz.
Coffee, at first ½ oz., latterly ½ oz.
Salt, at first ½ oz., latterly 1 oz.
Sugar, at first 2 oz. [latterly none].
Tea, at first ½ oz. [latterly none].
Sowens, latterly 1 quart.“We had a large stock of meat, both live and tinned. For live-stock, we had to open up a wide extent of grazing ground. We ate the fresh meat first in order to avoid loss from enemy's fire, failure of grass and water, lung sickness, etc. The tinned meat we stored in bomb-proof chambers and kept as reserve.
"Our stocks of meal were comparatively small, but we had a large supply of forage oats. These we ground into flour, and fermented the residue into sowens (a form of porridge), and the remaining husks went as forage to the horses.
"Fresh vegetables were largely grown within the defences, and for a greater part of the siege formed a regular portion of the ration.
"The cost of feeding the troops was 1s. 3d. per ration, or, with fresh vegetables, 1s. 6d.; about 3d. below the contract price in peace. Civilians paid 2s., and women in the laager 1s. 2d. All liquor was taken over and Baden-Powell's devices for depressing the spirits of the Boers and keeping up those of the garrison issued in 'tots' to the troops on wet nights, and I think saved much sickness.
"Natives.-For the natives we established four soup kitchens, at which horse stew was sold daily, and five sowens kitchens. Natives were all registered, to prevent fraud, and bought rations at one quart per adult, and one pint per child, at 3d. per pint.
"Defence watchmen, workmen, police, etc., and certified destitute persons were given free rations. The kitchens so managed paid their own expenses.
"They were under Captain Wilson, A.D.C., with Mr. Myers as cash taker and inspector."]
Baden-Powell’s devices for depressing the spirits of the Boers
and keeping up those of the garrison.
But no precautions against danger from shell fire or against starvation would
have availed, even against the lethargic hostilities of the Boers, without the
spirit of pluck and endurance which animated all the defenders of this solitary
outpost. And though it is true that in the enrolled troops, in the townspeople,
and in most of the natives Baden-Powell had excellent material to work upon, yet
this spirit was chiefly due to his own splendid example of calmness,
resourcefulness, and courage. "B. P.," as he became familiarly known, not only
in
Mafeking, but throughout the Empire, seemed never to sleep.
During the day he was at headquarters, ready at the telephone for news from any
of his outlying forts and trenches, or watching the movements of the enemy from
his outlook post. At night he would go off by himself on the veld, spying out
the Boer trenches or planning attacks or methods of deceiving the enemy and of
keeping up the spirits of his own men. His devices for encouraging the enemy's
nervousness were almost inexhaustible. He had some large megaphones
manufactured, the chief use of which was to send bogus orders, audible to the
Boers, about movements to threaten some of their trenches; dummy forts and dummy
armoured trains were set up as baits, which proved most successful in attracting
a great deal of Boer fire; on one occasion he armed some men with lances
manufactured at the railway workshops, and conducted them round all the trenches
well on the skyline, in order to make the Boers believe that a detachment of
the lancers, so dreaded since Elandslaagte, had secretly come in from the south
to reinforce him. By repeating the
lamp signals previously used on the occasion of a night
attack, he induced the Boers on another night to keep up aimless volleys at
empty space from some of the trenches that seemed to be threatened; or he would
annoy them and please the garrison by conveying a grandiloquent manifesto to
their trenches under a flag of truce, offering the burghers a free pardon if
they would return to their homes before he made up his mind to invade their
country,* and by sending messages to Snyman telling him he would never capture
Mafeking if he simply sat still and looked at it.
[ * Snyman himself sent a formal letter of protest against Baden Powell’s attempt to tamper with his men, and some of his Marico burghers sent the following reply, which entered more into the humour of the Colonel's proceedings:-" Sir, the burghers from Marico and elsewhere received your foolish notice with great surprise, as we have always regarded you as a man of education and patriotism, and also expected you to think the same of us. In conclusion, we wish to inform you that we are perfectly prepared to meet your troops, and that you must therefore let them loose as soon as possible.-Signed L. A. J. Botha, Peter D, Roux, Spencer R. Drake, and all the rest."]
On the other hand he relieved the intolerable monotony of the siege for the defenders by constantly finding some fresh occupation for them or subject of conversation. In his orders he would take them to a great extent into the secrets of the defence, making light of the Boer preparations and always confidently assuming that there was no cause for anxiety. A newspaper, The Mafeking Mail, was published regularly during the siege; entertainments, in which the Colonel took his share as a performer, baby-shows, horse-races and gymkhanas were organised. Special issues of stamps and paper money were authorised, which were as amusing as they were useful in supplying a dearth of ordinary stamps and small change; relief works were started for natives not employed in digging trenches or in scouting and too poor to pay for their rations, and every form of ingenuity was encouraged. Thus a traveller for a firm of acetylene gas manufacturers was discovered in the town, and employed in turning his knowledge to account in the production of searchlights; the women were set to make cartridge bags or nurse the sick and wounded; and the railway workshops were utilised for the manufacture of ammunition, and even of a 6-in. howitzer, which fired an 18-lb. shell a distance of 4,000 yards. An old eighteenth century ship's gun, marked by a curious coincidence with the unknown maker's initials B. P., was unearthed and used to fire round shot with some success. Never was there any sign of panic or want of method; the garrison accounts and the food supply were organised on a system which would have been creditable in a time of profound peace; arrangements were made for preventing exaggerated claims for damage after the town had been relieved; and a court of summary jurisdiction was set up. The hospitals were as well managed as the meagre resources allowed, and, when typhoid and diphtheria broke out, precautions were at once adopted for isolating the cases.
Dec. 26. Attack on Game Tree Fort.
During the last six weeks before Christmas Snyman kept
drawing his investing lines closer, but nothing of much note occurred until
Boxing-day, when an attack was delivered by the garrison on Eloff's fort at Game
Tree Hill, which commanded an important grazing area for cattle; a further
reason for attempting its capture was that, being the only fort due north of the
town, its possession would be of the greatest advantage if at any time a column
from the north should attempt to push its way through to the relief. This fort,
as far as could be seen, was simply a breastwork of sandbags with some kind of
shelter behind, and the permanent garrison was thought to number about forty,
but, owing to Commandant Snyman's custom of giving men passes to go home from
time to time, the actual garrison-especially at Christmas time-was supposed to
be less. The armoured train was ordered to move along the line to the north, and
the attacking force, consisting of three guns, two Maxims and 150 men, with one
gun and 110 men in support, to parade at 2 A.M.
on Boxing-day, the right wing being
under the command of Major Godley, the left under Colonel Here, with Major
Panzera in command of the guns. The guns took up a position 1,400 yards
south-west of the fort, and the armoured train crept out as far as it could go,
but not so far as had been intended, for it was found that the line had been
freshly destroyed to the left rear of the enemy's work. To the right of the
line, and almost abreast of the armoured train, were the Bechuanaland Rifles,
posted to act as a flanking party, while the assaulting party, consisting of two
squadrons of the Protectorate Regiment, advanced along the railway line and lay
down in the grass about 200 yards in rear of the armoured train. They were here
completely hidden from view. The orders to the several units were that the guns
and armoured train were to open a heavy cross-fire on the Boer fort at daybreak,
and continue it until the assaulting party, under Captain Vernon, had advanced
to within 200 yards of the fort. Unfortunately by some misunderstanding Captain
Vernon gave the signal for the guns to cease fire when he was still 1,200 yards
from his destination. Moreover, there happened at the time to be a double guard
at the fort, as the day guard had just arrived to relieve the night watch.
Vernon's
advance was over ground without a vestige of cover, but it was carried on
unhesitatingly under very hot fire right up to the Boer position. Even then,
though at point-blank range, a gallant attempt was made to storm it; some of the
attackers climbed on to the roof, but were unable to get inside, and others
fired into the loopholes. But the odds were too strong; Captains Vernon and
Sandford and Lieutenant Paton, the three officers of the squadron, were shot
dead, and half the men fell dead or wounded; Captain FitzClarence, then coming
up with the supporting squadron, was also wounded; but it was not until
Lieutenant Swinburne, who took his place, had made another fruitless effort to
enter the redoubt that the whole party fell back. But they did not finally
retire on Mafeking until orders had come from Baden-Powell. The losses had been
considerable, amounting to 3 officers and 19 men killed, 1 officer and 23 men
wounded, and 3 men taken prisoners, as against only eleven casualties of the
Boers; but the attack was not wasted, for it proved both to Boers and British
that the garrison was still quite ready to take the offensive.
Jan. and Feb. 1900. The Boers driven further back in the
brickfields and other quarters.
During January and February, when the town itself was felt to be completely
secure, the garrison began gradually pushing their opponents further away from
their own first line of defence. The principal area of fighting was the
brickfields, where the Boers seemed very securely established. Gangs of natives
were employed by the base commandant, Colonel Vyvyan, who had by this time given
up the command of the Town Guard to Major Goold-Adams, in pushing out a series
of parallels, connecting works, and sapping trenches towards the Boer
intrenchments. The covering parties and occupants of the English trenches were
Browne's and Marsh's
Cape Police and the coloured contingent under Captain Goodyear
and Sergeant Currie. Almost inch by inch these men worked their way out, driving
the Boers before them and at last forcing them to abandon their main redoubt,
1,700 yards from the town, and retire to a position 1,000 yards farther back.
During the whole period there was an almost continuous rifle fire going on,
more especially at night, when both sides had their working parties employed;
the firing then used to become particularly heavy, volley after volley following
in quick succession for minutes at a time, then lapsing into comparative
quietude, only to be followed before very long by a fresh outburst. For about a
fortnight the trenches of the enemy and those of the garrison were not more than
sixty yards apart, and the sniping parties on both sides acquired an almost
personal liking for their opponents, with whom they exchanged conversation as
well as shots.
At the same time that efforts were being made to drive back the Boer occupants in the brickfields further works were undertaken in other directions. To the north-east, near the convent, the Bechuanaland Rifles pushed out a trench close to one occupied by the Boers and made them evacuate it. To the north, along the line, the Railway division, under Captain More, constructed an advanced work. To the west Major Godley perfected the small advanced redoubt called Fort Ayr. On the south-west the natives managed, by constant sniping, to compel the Boers to evacuate their foremost work, Fort Cronje, and eventually succeeded in occupying and holding it until the end. To the south-east, between Cannon Kopje and the river, was constructed an advanced trench for the Nordenfelt gun which, in the hands of Sergeant Lowe, an old naval gunner, often engaged the Boer 94-pdr. with great effect, and finally succeeded in killing their chief artillerist with eight or ten men and in compelling the Boers to move the gun to a safer quarter.
March. The rigour of the investment relaxed.
On February 28 a determined attempt was made by the Boers to retake what they
had lost in the brickfields, but they were beaten off, and on March 22nd they
finally abandoned the whole of that area. A dynamite mine which they had left in
one of their trenches was fortunately discovered before any harm was done.
During the next month the Boers began gradually withdrawing some of their men
and guns, including the 94-pdr., and Baden-Powell, who was becoming anxious
about the food supply of the natives, was able to send out several parties of
them to Kanya, though he was not so successful in securing the mobs of cattle
which Plumer attempted to drive through the Boer lines.
News of relief.
By this time relief was almost within sight. Throughout the siege runners had
kept the garrison fitfully informed as to the state of affairs both north and
south, and news had occasionally been sent out of
Mafeking. On February 6 a message had come from Lord Roberts
asking the garrison to hold out till the middle of May, and an answer had been
sent back by Baden-Powell saying that they could hold out till the 22nd of that
mouth; by the beginning of May it was known that Mahon was starting with his
relief column.$ Many of the Boers had already moved off, and the remainder
seemed very quiet. The garrison, therefore, were hardly expecting any more
engagements before seeing Mahon.
May 12. Eloff's attack on the stad.
But at
4
A.M.
on the morning of May 12 very heavy firing was opened from the
Boer trenches on the east of the town. The English detachments, to whom that
quarter was assigned, were immediately
ordered to stand to their arms. At first it was thought
that the enemy was advancing, but from the stationary position of the flashes
from their rifles it was soon seen that there was no movement on their part, and
the incident was put down to one of the usual night alarms. In about half an
hour the firing began to die away, and at
5
A.M.
ceased entirely, but almost immediately rifle-shots were again
heard, this time in the direction of Hidden Hollow on the south-west, followed
by some cheering. Shortly afterwards flames were seen to be issuing from the
huts in the native stall. A. party of Boers had advanced along the bed of the
river cautiously and quietly, until challenged by the sentry over the Cossack
Post, detached from and about 400 yards in advance of Hidden Hollow Fort. The
sentry, on discovering with whom he had to deal, fired upon them, whereupon they
promptly returned the fire. The three men of the Cossack Post then retired,
firing as they went, in order to alarm the garrison of Hidden Hollow Fort, which
consisted of fifteen men of A squadron Protectorate Regiment under Lieutenant R.
W. Waller. The Boers thereupon dashed straight on into the stad, passing between
Hidden Hollow and Limestone Forts without attempting to capture either, and
immediately set light to some of the nearest huts.
This attacking party was led by Field-cornet Eloff. He had recently returned from a visit to his grandfather, the President, who had given him instructions to take Mafeking at all costs. Snyman had shown no great enthusiasm for the undertaking, but had allowed Eloff to make the attempt with 700 men, including forty foreigners, under Captain Weiss, and had promised to support him if he succeeded in entering Mafeking. Of these 700 only 225 had presented themselves at the meeting-place at 2 A.M. on the 12th, but Eloff had determined to pursue the undertaking, and, under the guidance of two Kaffirs and a deserter from the Protectorate Regiment, had, for the first time during the siege, penetrated Baden-Powell's inner lines. Eloff made two mistakes at the outset in omitting to capture Hidden Hollow and Limestone Forts, which blocked his line of retreat, and in thoroughly arousing the garrison by setting fire to the stad.
Elation of the garrison.
Immediately the Boers were discovered to be on the outskirts of the town the
alarm was sounded, and the garrison turned out joyfully at the prospect of a
fight. For long they had been waiting for so good a chance of coming to close
quarters with their enemies, and from their faces it might have been thought
that it was a relieving force rather than an assailant within their gates. Even
the women and children shared in the excitement, and the prisoners in the gaol
were allowed to shoulder a rifle for the defence. But, in spite of the hurry,
there was no confusion, and each man fell into his appointed place with hardly a
word. An inner defence line between the stad and the European town was formed by
the reserves of the Bechuanaland Rifles, of the Town Guard, and of the Railway
division.
Eloff captures Hore's headquarters.
Meanwhile the Boers, after setting fire to the stad, had divided into two equal
parties. One remained in the stad and proceeded to loot, the other, under Eloff
himself, rushed forward to Colonel Hore's headquarters, manned by two officers
and fifteen troopers besides Hore himself. Before Eloff's superior numbers Hore
was forced to surrender, and he and his men were thrust into a room of the fort,
which Eloff prepared to hold until he received the promised reinforcements.
Eloff and 97 prisoners captured by the evening.
Major Godley, in charge of the western defences, promptly posted Captain
FitzClarence's and Captain Lord Charles Bentinck's squadrons in such positions
as to cut off the Boers left in the stad from Eloff's detachment, and with a
small party of Cape Police and a Maxim drove off a halfhearted attempt by
Snyman to reinforce the assailants. The Boers in the stad had taken refuge in a
kraal and on a small kopje, but by the evening twenty-seven of them had been
taken prisoners and the rest driven off. Meanwhile Baden-Powell had been
bringing all available men to surround the Boers in the old Police Fort. Eloff
sent off two orderlies to inform Snyman of his position, but they were shot by
Godley's men on their way to the river. Snyman made some effort to support Eloff
with gun fire, but, being uncertain of his exact position, was afraid to send
his shells far into the town. Some of Eloff's men, towards evening, escaped from
the fort, but he himself, with the majority, held out bravely till the evening,
when he rushed into the room where Hore was confined and surrendered with his
party to his own prisoners, on condition that the firing should cease. Shortly
afterwards Baden-Powell came up, asked Eloff to dinner, and had the remaining
ninety-seven prisoners marched off under guard. Besides prisoners the Boers also
lost eight killed and twenty-eight wounded on this day.
May 17. The relief.
On the following day the Town Guard was re-armed with the captured Mausers, and
on the 15th a message was received to say that Colonel Mahon and Colonel Plumer
had joined hands at Jan Massibi, twenty-two miles away to the west, and would
make a combined movement towards
Mafeking next
day. On the morning of the 16th a carrier-pigeon arrived from Colonel Plumer
with a message saying that the two columns had started at daylight that morning.
In expectation of the relief, about 12 o'clock every elevated position was
seized by the expectant garrison, and at about 1.30 their sight was gladdened by
the bursting of a shell some seven miles away. This was followed in rapid
succession by others, each one bursting nearer and nearer, and showing that the
advance was still proceeding. Then Boers were seen retiring from one position to
another, and at last, at about
4 P.M., there suddenly flashed from one of the black masses seen
in the distance the flicker of a heliograph. It took some little time for
signallers to send an answering flash, in reply to which came the message, "From Colonel Mahon's force, How are you getting on." This was replied to by the
word "Welcome." During the afternoon a few poor horses were collected to enable
some mounted men and two 7-pdr. guns to demonstrate in
Mahon's
direction. About dusk the relief column could just be seen about six miles off;
they were slowly advancing, the enemy still retiring before them. At 7
P.M.
Major Karri
Davis, of the Imperial Light Horse, and about ten men marched in, to the
frenzied delight of the inhabitants. At 4
A.M.
the next morning the whole column came in without any further
opposition, and Mafeking was relieved.
The value of the defence to
England.
The dramatic capture of Eloff was a fitting close to this extraordinary siege,
in which, though invested and unable to escape, the defenders were throughout
far more aggressive than their assailants. Kruger, on hearing of Snyman's
failure to co-operate with Eloff, wrote to ask if it was due to drunkenness; but
really Snyman's conduct on this occasion was quite of a piece with the whole
conduct of the siege both by himself and Cronje. There is no doubt that during
the first month, when the defences were incomplete, Cronje could easily have
taken the town by a resolute attack with his superior numbers and artillery.
Later it might have been difficult, though even at the last Eloff's gallant
attempt showed that if such an attack had been well supported from all sides
Mafeking
might have fallen. Baden-Powell justly gained immense credit for his plucky
defence. It appealed to Englishmen's delight in a good game played with
boundless audacity. Merely as an example of what can be accomplished in war by
ingenuity and a bold front, this defence was worth accomplishing; and
Baden-Powell did more, for he kept nearly 10,000 Boers idle during the first
most critical month of the war for England, and during the whole seven months
never less than 2000, at a cost to the English of only 35 killed, 101 wounded,
and 27 prisoners.*
[* The Boar losses have been estimated on good authority at 300.]
 |
L. S. Amery, The
Times History of the War in South Africa (1900-1909). Preface and Introduction |
|
 |
L. S. Amery, The
Times History of the War in South Africa (1900-1909). The Times Map of South Africa. |
|
|
Arthur Conan
Doyle, The Great Boer War (1902) Preface and Table of Contents |
|
 |
"Events at Mafeking" is the final chapter of Howard Hensman's A History of Rhodesia. Hensman writes: "The book was mainly conceived and written before the out break of the war, but with the object of making the volume as complete as possible chapters dealing with the sieges of Kimberly and Mafeking and Colonel Plumer's Rhodesian force have been added." | |
 |
Perspectives
on the South African War. A collection of links to primary and contemporary resources on the war in South Africa. |
|
 |
Return to the Baden-Powell Home Page | |
|
The Pine Tree Web Home Page: A Collection of the
Author's Links
Your feedback, comments and suggestions are appreciated.
Please write to: Lewis P. Orans
Copyright ©
Lewis P. Orans, 2002
Last Modified: 6:16 AM on August 22, 2002
